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categories? Second: To what extent do jurors assign culpability in the manner 
assumed by the Model Penal Code (MPC)? 
In prior work, we challenged numerous assumptions underlying the 
MPC mental state architecture, which divides guilty minds into four kinds: 
purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent. Our experiments showed that 
subjects had profound difficulty categorizing some of the mental states, 
particularly recklessness, in the context of scenarios in which hypothetical 
actors caused harmful results. And, when asked to punish hypothetical actors, 
subjects punished knowing behavior and reckless behavior indistinguishably.  
Here, we extend our prior work in two main ways. First, we show that 
a person’s ability to apply the MPC mental states is susceptible to subtle 
variations in the language that defines and communicates them. For instance, 
we demonstrate that using slightly different wording can significantly improve 
participants’ ability to accurately identify the mental state of recklessness 
(notwithstanding that reckless and knowing mental states remain by far the 
hardest to classify). Second, we show that even when people can see the mental 
state distinctions that the MPC draws, they don’t necessarily rank order the 
mental states—by culpability level—in the order the MPC assumes.  
These findings raise questions about the normative basis for the 
knowing/reckless distinction in the MPC's mental state hierarchy in the context 
of result elements. Further, because even small changes in phrasing can produce 
significant differences in juror evaluation, the findings raise genuine concerns 
about the adequacy of MPC-based culpability instructions in criminal cases. 
Our results suggest the need for a critical reexamination of the substantial 
divide between the expectations and assumptions of drafters of criminal codes, 
on one hand, and empirical reality, on the other. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
To be guilty of a crime, generally one must commit a bad act 
while in a culpable state of mind. But the language used to define, 
partition, and communicate the variety of culpable mental states (in 
Latin, mens rea) is crucially important. For depending on the mental 
state that juries attribute to him, a defendant can be convicted—for the 
very same act and the very same consequence—of different crimes, each 
with different sentences. 
The influential Model Penal Code (“MPC”) of 1962 divided 
culpable mental states into four now-familiar kinds: purposeful, 
knowing, reckless, and negligent.1 Both before the MPC and since, 
scholars in criminal law and philosophy have actively debated how best 
to define and apply the mens rea categories.2 Yet few empirical studies 
have explored the actual relationships between specific mens rea 
formulations and legally relevant outcomes. 
A 2011 article coauthored by several of us, Sorting Guilty Minds, 
presented experiments that tested the MPC’s twin assumptions that: 
(1) ordinary people naturally do—or at least can, when instructed—
distinguish these four categories of mental states with reasonable 
 1.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).  
 2.  See, e.g., LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009); Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the 
Limits of Culpability’s Relevance, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 109; Claire 
Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 895 (2000); Douglas N. Husak, The 
Sequential Principle of Relative Culpability, 1 LEGAL THEORY 493 (1995); Paul H. Robinson & Jane 
A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 
STAN. L. REV. 681 (1983); Kenneth W. Simons, Should The Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea 
Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179 (2003). 
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reliability; and (2) holding the act and harm constant, the average 
person would punish acts reflecting these four mental states in the 
manner corresponding to the MPC hierarchy—that is, they would 
punish purposeful conduct the most severely and negligent conduct the 
least.3 
Those experiments found that these assumptions held, for the 
most part. But an interesting and important exception emerged at the 
boundary between knowing and reckless conduct: in sorting the mental 
states and in assigning punishment, subjects were much less able to 
differentiate between knowing and reckless conduct. 
On the basis of those findings, the article outlined several 
possible reforms—assuming the results were validated in future 
studies.4 To validate and extend those results, we have conducted a 
series of additional experiments, reported here, with more than 1,600 
additional subjects. 
Two primary results emerge. First, we demonstrate that 
modifying the language used to communicate mens rea can significantly 
improve participants’ ability to accurately identify the mental state of 
recklessness. However, subject accuracy in identifying the reckless and 
knowing mental states remains far below the classification accuracy for 
the other mental states. 
Second, notwithstanding the gains in sorting accuracy, our 
subjects did not actually punish knowing and reckless behavior 
differently. Our observation that improved sorting of knowing and 
reckless mental states does not result in a corresponding distinction in 
the punishment ratings of knowing and reckless behavior suggests that 
subjects do not see a clear moral distinction between those two mental 
states, at least in relation to the “result” element of offenses. These 
findings raise, but do not fully answer, questions about the normative 
basis for including the knowing/reckless distinction in the MPC’s 
mental state hierarchy in the context of result elements. 
These findings also have implications for legal practice. 
Legislatures and courts use a variety of words to define and 
communicate mens rea. Typically overlooked is whether a particular 
formulation of a mental state will matter for juror understanding and 
decision-making. When jury instructions are reviewed on appeal, 
judges have only their experience and intuition to guide them as to the 
possible misunderstanding caused by particular wording. Our results 
here suggest that juror decision-making is sensitive to the precise 
 3.  Francis X. Shen, Morris B. Hoffman, Owen D. Jones, Joshua D. Greene & René Marois, 
Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011). We will subsequently refer to this article as 
the “original study.” 
 4.  Id. at 1348.  
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language of mens rea in ways that legal decision-makers may not 
anticipate. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes our original 
study in the context of what little existing empirical literature there is 
on juror assessments of MPC mental states. Part II details the design 
and results of the new experiments. Part III discusses the implications. 
Two appendices provide additional details of the experiments, including 
the full text of the scenarios used. 
II. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
The Model Penal Code, developed by the American Law Institute 
in the mid-twentieth century, has been highly influential in shaping the 
definition of mens rea terminology in state criminal codes and in 
judicial opinions.5 The vast bulk of the states—thirty-four of them6—
either have adopted or have been heavily influenced by the Model Penal 
Code, which since 1962 has divided the universe of potential culpable 
mental states into: purposeful, knowing, reckless, and negligent.7 Even 
codes that continue to use common law terms have been interpreted in 
light of Model Penal Code concepts and definitions.8 Due to the MPC’s 
substantial and continued influence, scholars in criminal law and 
philosophy have actively debated how best to define and apply the mens 
rea categories.9 However, surprisingly little research has examined how 
laypeople—who are most commonly charged with applying the Model 
Penal Code’s mens rea provisions—actually interpret and apply the 
Code. 
 5.  Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: 
Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 540–41 (1988); Paul H. 
Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 815–16 
(1980); Robinson & Grall, supra note 2, at 691–703 (discussing MPC approach to elements 
analysis); Simons, supra note 2, at 180–81. 
 6.  Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief 
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007). 
 7.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).  
 8.  The U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal courts also cite to the Model Penal Code with 
some frequency. See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011) 
(referencing the MPC to provide the appropriate definition for several mental state classifications 
in an attempt to distinguish these mental states from the concept of willful blindness as it has 
been articulated by the Courts of Appeals). 
 9.  See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 2; Brown, supra note 2; Finkelstein, supra 
note 2; Husak, supra note 2; Robinson & Grall, supra note 2; Simons, supra note 2. 
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A. Research on Mental State Attributions 
Empirical research on the ability of laypeople to distinguish 
specific mental states as required by law is only now emerging.10 In 
1992, researchers at the University of Washington investigated how 
students interpret and apply the legal definition of four culpable mental 
states: purpose (“P”),11 knowledge (“K”), recklessness (“R”), and 
negligent (“N”).12 They found that subjects could only distinguish 
between the extremes of P and N. Subjects could not reliably 
distinguish in the middle of the hierarchy: P vs. K, P vs. R, K vs. R, K 
vs. N, and R vs. N.13 
Jury instructions made no difference in subjects’ ability to make 
these distinctions. When subjects were asked to assign punishment 
ratings, these ratings again did not differentiate between any mental 
states aside from the extremes of P and N. This result held true both 
for those subjects who did not have the legal definitions provided and 
for those who did.14 
Also in the early 1990s, legal scholar Paul Robinson and 
psychologist John Darley ran a series of experiments that, in contrast 
 10.  Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
317, 320–21 (2009):  
[C]ontemporary criminal law requires jurors to be latter-day Kreskins—to not only 
reliably distinguish nearly indistinguishable mental states, but also to accurately 
determine which of many possible mental states the defendant actually possessed at 
the time of the crime. Is such mindreading possible? . . . Given the centrality of mens 
rea to criminal responsibility, we would expect legal scholars to have provided a 
persuasive answer to this question. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the 
truth. 
Justin D. Levinson, Mentally Misguided: How State of Mind Inquiries Ignore Psychological Reality 
and Overlook Cultural Differences, 49 HOW. L.J. 1, 3 (2005) (“Scholars have not yet . . . empirically 
examined the psychological mechanisms involved in understanding others’ minds in the legal 
setting.”). For a more detailed discussion of these studies, see Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1320–
26. 
 11.  The authors of the 1992 study used the term “intent” to refer to the mental state category 
that we reference as purpose in the present work. Because they convey the same legal significance, 
we refer to the category as purpose (“P”) throughout. We also use a blameless (“B") condition to 
signal the absence of a culpable mental state. 
 12.  Laurence J. Severance, Jane Goodman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Inferring the Criminal 
Mind: Toward a Bridge Between Legal Doctrine and Psychological Understanding, 20 J. CRIM. 
JUST. 107 (1992). Surprisingly, this study has to date been cited only once within the Westlaw JLR 
database.  
 13.  The researchers found that, when rank-ordering mental states, “legally naïve subjects 
could not, on their own, reliably agree on differentiation between ‘criminal knowledge’ and 
‘criminal recklessness’ nor reliably distinguish these from other legally relevant mental states.” 
Id. at 115.  
 14.  In addition, Severance et al. carried out a content analysis of subject-generated mental 
state definitions. They sought to determine, qualitatively, the extent to which subjects’ definitions 
of the mens rea terms varied from the legal definitions. The researchers found that subjects often 
had their own set of preconceptions that deviated from the legal concepts of mens rea. Id. at 114.  
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to the 1992 study, found that individuals do typically assign liability 
and punishment in a manner generally consistent with the MPC.15 As 
summarized by Robinson and Darley, “[T]he responses of our 
subjects . . . assign a higher degree of liability to the knowing versus the 
reckless commission of all offenses.”16 
A decade after the Robinson and Darley study, law professor 
Justin Levinson conducted an experiment that explored the mediating 
role of culture in the assessment of defendants’ mental states.17 While 
the primary objective of the study was to assess cultural differences in 
assessments of mental states and culpability, Levinson noted that even 
across cultures, in the majority of the scenarios the responses provided 
did not match the responses predicted by the MPC.18 
Most recently, in 2012, psychologists Pam Mueller and John 
Darley and legal scholar Lawrence Solan published a study examining 
mental states and punishment in civil disputes.19 The study used as its 
centerpiece a series of vignettes based on a case in which a workman is 
electrocuted while attempting an emergency repair job.20 The 
researchers manipulated the level of knowledge that the employer had 
about the employee’s risk of being electrocuted. 
The primary finding of the study was that “not only do people 
regard the side effects of knowing acts as intentional when assigning 
liability, but they also regard the side effects of reckless acts as 
intentional when making liability judgments.”21 This is consistent with 
findings in moral psychology that subjects tend to characterize known 
negative side effects, but not positive side effects, as intended.22 
The researchers then followed up by running an additional 
experiment manipulating the perceived level of risk (as communicated 
 15.  PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME (1995). 
 16.  Id. at 87. 
 17.  Levinson, supra note 10, at 2–3.  
 18.  Only when averaging over all four fact patterns does Levinson find some evidence that 
“participants maintained a folk mental state hierarchy,” placing “purpose above knowledge above 
recklessness” in their punishment ratings. Id. at 20. But these results were not robust, as they did 
not hold in each fact pattern when analyzed individually. Id. at 21.  
 19.  Pam A. Mueller, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, When Does Knowledge Become 
Intent?: Perceiving the Minds of Wrongdoers, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 859, 859 (2012). The 
researchers asked, “[W]hen judging behavior, do people distinguish between intentional and 
knowing acts, knowing and reckless acts, reckless and negligent acts, and so on?” Id. 
 20.  Id. at 865 (noting that “[t]he scenarios are based loosely on Parret v. Unicco Service Co. 
(2005), a case decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma”). 
 21.  Id. at 875. 
 22.  Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language, 63 ANALYSIS 
190, 193 (2003); Thomas Nadelhoffer, Bad Acts, Blameworthy Agents, and Intentional Actions: 
Some Problems for Juror Impartiality, 9 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 203 (2006).  
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by percentage likelihood of the employee injury occurring).23 
Noteworthy from the results was the finding that—even with only a 3% 
perceived likelihood of the harm occurring—35% of subjects (when 
given the reckless treatment) concluded that the employer acted 
intentionally.24 
Summarizing these empirical studies as a whole, it is apparent 
that there is much variation in jurors’ abilities to accurately assess 
defendants’ mental states. Methodological limitations in previous 
studies may explain this variation, including study designs in which 
experimental subjects were exposed to repeated variations of the same 
fact patterns as well as differences in subject pools across the studies.25 
B. Sorting Guilty Minds: Summary of Results 
In our original study,26 we exposed subjects to a series of short, 
unique scenarios, each of which was designed to be straightforward and 
reasonably believable on its face, clearly communicative of a distinct 
MPC mental state, and concise enough so that subjects could read 
multiple scenarios within a reasonable time.27 Moreover, because 
previous research has pointed to the interaction of harm level with 
mental state determinations and because the MPC and many states 
place differential importance on the mental state boundaries depending 
on the severity of the offense, we also varied the harm level across our 
scenarios.28 
 23.  The risk levels used were 3, 20, 50, 80, 97, and 100%, respectively. 
 24.  Mueller et al., supra note 19, at 888. The researchers conducted additional studies to 
determine whether the type of knowledge held by the employer affected intentionality judgments. 
They found that “knowing who is going to be injured, at least within a limited population, is 
irrelevant to judgments of intentionality; knowing when someone is going to be injured is relevant 
to intentionality judgments; and knowing how someone is going to be injured is essential for 
perceiving intentionality.” Id. 
 25.  For additional discussion of these issues, see Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1324–26. 
 26.  In the present Article, when we refer to “we” in reference to this 2011 study, we are 
referring only to the subset of the current authorship who coauthored the original study. 
 27.  These constraints raised a number of questions about how to effectively and efficiently 
communicate the protagonist’s motivation and intent. John’s action in each of our scenarios was 
explained to subjects with a simple, and typically neutral, motivation. For instance, in one 
scenario, subjects read that John acted because he was angry after an argument with a player on 
an opposing softball team. Scenario construction was also sensitive to the fact that, as found in 
research by philosopher Thomas Nadelhoffer, moral judgments about the actor involved may 
influence mental state assessment. Nadelhoffer, supra note 22, at 203.  
 28.  For a discussion of the relationship between judgments of intentionality and harm 
caused, see Joshua Knobe, The Concept of Intentional Action: A Case Study in the Uses of Folk 
Psychology, 130 PHIL. STUD. 203 (2006), and Edouard Machery, The Folk Concept of Intentional 
Action: Philosophical and Experimental Issues, 23 MIND & LANGUAGE 165 (2008).  
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Applying these principles, we drafted scenarios featuring a 
protagonist (always named John) whose actions resulted in various 
levels of harm, which we categorized into three levels.29 We organized 
the individual scenarios within “themes.” For purposes of this 
discussion, we use the term “theme,” which is akin to previous 
researchers’ “stem,” to refer to the general fact pattern. Each theme had 
five variants, one for each mental state. The only difference between 
each variant was the manipulation of John’s mental state as to the 
resulting harm. Because nothing else changed between the variants, 
this allowed us to attribute differences in behavior to variations in 
mental state. 
Every mental state variant of a theme shared the same first and 
third sentence. The first sentence always served as an introductory 
sentence (e.g., “John is gardening in his backyard, where there are 
many plants and many small rocks.”), and the third sentence always 
presented the resulting harm (e.g., “The rock hits the window, but since 
his neighbor’s window is made of especially tough glass, the rock 
bounces off and causes no harm.”). The second sentence was modified 
in each variant in order to introduce the scenario-specific mental state 
for a given theme (e.g., “Wanting to get rid of a small rock, he throws 
the rock over the fence, aware that there is a substantial risk that the 
rock will also hit his neighbor’s nearby window, but choosing to ignore 
it.”).30 Thus, within each theme there were five scenarios: one each for 
purposeful, knowing, reckless, negligent, and blameless. We created 
thirty themes, ten in each of three harm-level categories, giving us a 
total of one hundred and fifty unique scenarios.31 To ensure that 
subjects could not easily learn the nature of our manipulations, we 
systematically rotated the mental state signals across scenarios.32 As 
we discuss in Part III, this approach did not allow us to determine 
whether particular signals were related to subject behavior—that is, 
whether a particular signal contributed to higher or lower accuracy in 
mental state identification. 
 29.  While the nature of the harm was heterogeneous across scenarios, the resulting harm 
was classified into one of three categories: high harm (causing death or serious physical injury); 
medium harm (causing minor injury or great property damage); and low harm (causing no injury 
or minor property damage).  
 30.  All scenarios were constructed so that they would have roughly the same total number 
of words. Scenario length was seventy-three words, plus or minus two words.  
 31.  For the full set of scenarios, see infra Appendix B.  
 32.  We also “counterbalanced” the presentation of mental state signals across the three harm 
levels. That is, subjects did not see all the scenarios and respective mental states in the same order. 
Rather, we also used randomization in presenting scenarios to mitigate against any foreseeable 
order effects.  
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Several experiments were run in the original study, but we focus 
here on the version of the experiment in which subjects had full access 
to the mental states definitions throughout the experiment. As noted 
above, one problem with some of the earlier research on this topic was 
that the design had subjects assess the same fact pattern multiple 
times, only changing the mental state of the fact pattern across trials. 
Doing so would have made it clear to the observant participant that the 
actor’s mental state was being manipulated on each trial. To avoid this 
problem in our experiments, subjects saw a given fact pattern only once. 
Therefore, each subject read thirty of the total one hundred and fifty 
scenarios, six from each of the five mental states, and one, randomly 
assigned, from each theme.33 In the rating experiments, after reading 
each scenario subjects were asked: “On a scale from 0–9, with 0 being 
no punishment and 9 being extreme punishment, how much should 
John be punished for his behavior?”34  
The original study found that punishment ratings were highest 
for purposeful action. At the other end of the spectrum, blameless 
punishment averages were the lowest, and negligent averages were the 
second lowest.35 In the middle, punishment for K and R was generally 
less than P and more than N. These results show not only that subjects 
 33.  Subjects also were given five practice scenarios, one from each mental state and spanning 
the approximate range of harms, before the actual experiment, in order to familiarize them with 
the interface and the experimental task. These practice themes were developed in addition to the 
thirty themes used in the actual experiment. 
 34.  In the original study and in this Article, when asked to rate punishment, subjects were 
given a 0-to-9 scale. We used text next to the numbers on the scale to communicate to subjects that 
0 reflected no punishment and 9 reflected the most extreme punishment. In each study, we used 
a series of anchoring scenarios to introduce participants to the range of harms they would see 
during the experiment. The reported analysis standardized punishment ratings to control for the 
possibility that subjects likely had different understandings of the type of punishment associated 
with each number. Moreover, as an additional check, we ran a separate experiment in which we 
asked subjects (after they completed the punishment task) to provide us with a description of their 
personal scale, i.e., what type of punishment did they associate with the number one, five, and so 
forth. We found these subjective punishment scales to show a large amount of concordance across 
individuals.  
  It is important to recognize that research in moral psychology has found that individuals 
may assign blame differently than they assign punishment. See, e.g., Jennifer K. Robbennolt, 
Outcome Severity and Judgments of “Responsibility”: A Meta-Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 2575, 2580 (2006) (discussing the variety of outcome variables that researchers have 
used to measure responsibility judgments). To account for this possibility, we ran a set of blame-
rating experiments, identical to the punishment rating experiments, except for a change in the 
rating question asked. Thus, we reran experiments one, two, three, and five with a focus on blame 
rather than punishment. In these additional experiments, subjects were asked, after reading each 
scenario: “On a scale from 0–9, with 0 being not at all blameworthy and 9 being extremely 
blameworthy, how blameworthy is John for his behavior?” The results from the blame-rating 
experiments followed the same pattern as the punishment-rating experiments we discuss in the 
text.  
 35.  Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1337–44. 
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punished in these categories in accord with the normative suppositions 
reflected in the MPC but also that subjects were very good at 
distinguishing these three categories of mental states from one another, 
even if they were not explicitly identifying the mental state of the actor 
in their evaluations of each scenario. However, subjects did not 
demonstrate differentiation of their punishment ratings at the junction 
between K and R. K was often punished no differently, or even less 
harshly, than R, a result not at all in keeping with the MPC’s 
hierarchical assumptions. 
Why didn’t we see, even when we gave subjects the MPC 
definitions, higher punishment ratings for K scenarios than for R 
scenarios? There are at least two plausible explanations. First, it could 
be that subjects are capable of identifying a conceptual difference 
between knowing and reckless action but employ a moral calculus in 
which knowing and reckless actors are punished roughly the same. If 
this is the case, then the subjects’ behavior focuses attention on the 
normative question of whether causing harm knowingly is indeed more 
culpable than causing harm recklessly.36 
This deep normative question is beyond the more limited scope 
of the present empirical investigation, but a brief discussion of the 
MPC’s normative presuppositions is warranted. Although the MPC 
often distinguishes between knowing and reckless action for the 
purpose of defining culpability, there are surprisingly few instances 
where the drafters of the MPC employed categorical differences 
between K and R for result elements of offenses.37 For example, murder 
 36.  In the original study, we ran versions of the experiment in which we asked subjects how 
much “blame” (as opposed to punishment) they would assign to the scenario protagonist. The 
results for the blame and punishment results were substantively similar, and to ease the 
presentation of results we described punishment ratings as reflecting subjects’ assessments of 
moral culpability. As the original study recognized, however, blame and punishment are not 
synonymous. Two equally blameworthy individuals may be punished differently (by subjects and 
by the criminal justice system) on the basis of other utilitarian considerations such as 
incapacitation or deterrence. Thus, we cannot conclude with certainty that a difference in 
punishment ratings (or an absence of a difference) is due to a difference in subject assessment of 
moral culpability. This caveat aside, however, other empirical studies have demonstrated that 
punishment ratings are primarily driven by retributive notions of justice. E.g., Kevin M. 
Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (2006).  
 37.  See Robinson & Grall, supra note 2, at 723–24 (noting that the Model Penal Code refers 
to, but does not define, result and circumstance elements, and plausibly suggesting that result 
elements should be defined as circumstances changed by the actor, for example, causing a death 
in homicide or causing a fire in arson). Result elements are the consequence of one's actions (such 
as the death of the victim) that the state must prove the defendant brought about. For many 
offenses, the state must also, or instead, prove that one or more circumstance elements obtain (for 
example, that the package in the defendant's possession contains illegal drugs). There are not 
many pure result offenses in the MPC. 
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and aggravated assault include causing the result purposely, 
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to human life. A key feature of many extreme indifference 
cases is heightened probability of causing the harm, thereby blending 
into K. In other result offenses, the offense is typically punishable at 
the same level for P, K, and R if the forbidden result occurs.38 
A second possible explanation for the subjects’ failure to 
distinguish between K and R in their punishment ratings is that they 
are simply confused when trying to make the distinction. That is, 
subjects would punish K and R differently if they could identify the 
difference in mental states, but they cannot. 
One experiment in our original study attempted to address this 
difference between subjects’ ability to sort the mental states and their 
normative treatment of those states once sorted. Subjects were provided 
with the definitions of the mental states alongside each scenario and 
were instructed, “Please select from the question options below the 
definition that best matches John’s mental state in this scenario.” This 
allowed us to determine, for each mental state, subjects’ ability to 
correctly classify the mental state of the actor in the scenario in terms 
of the MPC hierarchy. 
The results suggested that subjects could identify purposeful 
and blameless scenarios with a high degree of accuracy. Subjects 
correctly identified purposeful scenarios 78% of the time and correctly 
identified blameless scenarios 88% of the time. Subjects were most 
likely to err in the middle categories of knowing (50% success rate), 
reckless (40% success rate), and negligent (48% success rate). 
This low level of accuracy in identifying knowing and reckless 
mental states made it difficult to know which of our two proposed 
mechanisms explained the punishment ratings, but it was clear that we 
could not rule out the possibility that subjects simply couldn’t 
distinguish the two mental states—and that this could explain the 
indistinguishable punishment ratings.39 
 38.  Take, as an example, the crime of burglary in the second degree (inflicting harm during 
a burglary), MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2)(a) (1962), and the crime of cruelty to animals, id. § 
250.11. In both cases the MPC does not create gradations between P, K, and R. One 
counterexample is “causing catastrophe”—which is a second-degree felony if committed with P or 
K, but third degree if committed with R. Id. § 220.2(1). In this case, however, there may be a 
significant moral difference between knowing that a catastrophic result will occur and knowing 
that there is a real but small chance that it will. This offense probably should have included 
extreme recklessness (“eR”) cases in the second-degree felony. 
 39.  We also ran a final experiment combining sorting and rating. We designed this 
experiment to test whether exposing subjects to the sorting task first may result in punishment 
differences, perhaps due to better appreciation of the mental state gradations. This design also 
allowed us to test whether those who were better able to identify mental states showed greater 
differentiation in punishment ratings, particularly at the K/R boundary. To test this, we had 
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The original study thus suggested that jury-eligible subjects 
cannot distinguish between knowing, reckless, and negligent conduct 
with great accuracy. But the study also left open the possibility that 
this accuracy could be improved by refining the language used to define 
the MPC mental states and to signal them in the research scenarios. 
The research team therefore set out to investigate whether improving 
the language of mens rea could improve the ability of subjects to 
recognize, sort, and rate these mental states as expected. 
III. NEW EXPERIMENTS: DESCRIPTION & RESULTS 
A. Three New Experiments 
The results of the original study were premised on the 
assumption that the scenario protagonist’s mental state was clearly 
signaled to subjects and that the mental state categories that the 
scenarios were being sorted into were clearly defined. This assumption 
allowed us to interpret the failure to distinguish between knowing and 
reckless scenarios as the subjects’ failure. But it is possible that the 
original results were sensitive to the way we defined or communicated 
the mental states. 
Language might have mattered in three possible ways. First, the 
MPC definitions provided to subjects might not have been clear enough. 
Second, the specific language used in the scenarios to communicate 
mental states might have had a substantial effect on how individuals 
interpreted the scenarios. Third, the reckless signals in particular may 
not have properly conveyed the substance of the category as intended 
by the MPC drafters. We designed three new experiments to address 
these three possibilities. 
1. Revised MPC Definitions Experiment 
Essential to both the sorting and the rating tasks were the 
definitions provided to subjects for the five mental states (purposeful, 
knowing, reckless, negligent, and blameless). Would a different 
formulation of the MPC mental states definitions produce more 
subjects first sort fifteen scenarios according to MPC definitions. These same subjects were then 
asked to rate fifteen different scenarios. The results from this experiment indicated that sorting 
the scenarios first did not materially change the punishment ratings these same subjects provided. 
Additionally, limiting the analysis of the punishment ratings task to only those who sorted with 
above 75% accuracy, there remains no significant difference in punishment ratings at the K/R 
boundary. Thus, even those who seem to be better able to utilize and understand the 
knowing/reckless distinction still fail to make a clear moral distinction between the two. The same 
is true for the “bad sorters” (i.e., subjects with overall accuracy below 50%).  
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accurate sorting and more differentiation in punishment, especially in 
the knowing and reckless scenarios? To find out, we ran a new 
experiment in which we modified the MPC definitions provided to 
subjects. Table 1 compares the original and new definitions.40 
Because they were clearly the categories that subjects struggled 
with the most, we focused our revisions on the three middle categories: 
knowing (50% accurate in original study), reckless (40% accurate), and 
negligent (48% accurate).41 
The Model Penal Code emphasizes that the main difference 
between knowing and reckless behavior is the actor’s perceived 
probability of risk.42 In the original experiment, we established this 
difference in perceived risk by telling subjects that a person acts 
“knowingly” when he is aware that his conduct is practically certain to 
cause the result, and that a person acts “recklessly” when he is 
conscious of a substantial risk that a result will occur. Thus, the 
difference in probability was that between practically certain and 
substantial risk. This tracks the language used in the MPC.43 
Also tracking the MPC, in the original study, we told subjects 
that a person acts “knowingly” when he is aware that his conduct is 
practically certain to cause the result but that a person acts “recklessly” 
when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustified risk that 
a result will occur or that a circumstance exists. The addition of the 
“consciously disregards” language was problematic because it may have 
erroneously suggested to subjects that such a conscious choice was not 
an element of knowing action. Knowing action also, of course, requires 
an actor to consciously disregard a risk—indeed, an even greater risk—
that his actions will cause the harmful result.44 By removing the 
 40.  The study design—in which subjects read through thirty scenarios—requires 
parsimonious communication of the protagonist’s mental state. In revising definitions, we aimed 
to further improve the clarity of the signals while maintaining this parsimony. This desire for 
parsimony, as well as the need to isolate the differences between scenarios, prevented us from 
developing more elaborate fact patterns in which each mental state is communicated primarily 
through circumstantial evidence and not through the signaling words alone. Future research can 
investigate the extent to which alternative research designs do a better (or worse) job at 
communicating mental states if they convey information in a way that more closely matches the 
types of evidence available at trial. 
 41.  We also edited the blameless definition to improve clarity, as “lacked any of the culpable 
mental states” was ambiguous and could mean “lacked just one of the mental states,” not “lacked 
all of them.” 
 42.  See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §2.02 cmt. at 236–37 (1985). 
 43.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. 
 44.  An alternative would have been to insert a choice clause into the knowing scenarios, but 
this would have been more cumbersome, and, at least anecdotally, the “consciously disregard” 
language could have generated even more confusion. In addition, this change had the added 
advantage of removing what seems a priori a negatively valenced word (“disregard”), which, when 
compared to the more positive word “knowing,” might have contributed to the subjects’ confusion. 
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“consciously disregards” language from the reckless definition, we more 
clearly conveyed to subjects that the primary difference between K and 
R was the perceived probability of risk. 
Another difference between the original K and R definitions was 
the inclusion of the word “unjustified” in the original reckless definition. 
Exactly how the dual requirements of substantial and unjustified risk 
are meant to operate is ambiguous and has been debated by MPC 
commentators.45 For our purposes here, the goal was not to settle these 
deep normative debates about the proper contours of the reckless 
category but rather to operationalize the definition in a simple way that 
more clearly differentiated it from the other mental states.46 
The same logic led us to remove the word “unjustified” from the 
revised definition of negligent. In the original study, we told subjects 
that a person acts negligently when, through a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise, he fails to 
perceive a substantial and unjustified risk that a result will occur or 
that a circumstance exists. 
In addition to striking the word “unjustified,” we made one 
further modification to both the reckless and negligent definitions. The 
original definitions both referred to a “risk that a result will occur or 
that a circumstance exists.” This tracks the MPC language, which is 
designed to apply both to result and circumstance elements. But 
because we focus in this set of studies only on result elements, we 
refined the definition and removed the language that referenced 
circumstance elements. 
Using these new definitions, but without otherwise changing the 
experimental design, we ran a Revised MPC Definitions Experiment.47 
 45.  See Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 931, 933–35 (2000); Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All?: Thoughts on 
Alexander’s Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 955, 956–59 (2000); 
Simons, supra note 2, at 189–92; David M. Treiman, Recklessness and the Model Penal Code, 9 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 281, 362–67 (1981). 
 46.  We did not implicate the unjustifiable requirement in the fact patterns used in these 
experiments. Rather, in all of the fact patterns (except the blameless ones), the scenario was 
deliberately constructed so that the actor’s conduct was unjustifiable. Thus, including 
“unjustifiable” in some but not all of the culpable mental state definitions would have been an 
additional and unnecessary distraction. While the concept of justification is sometimes an 
important issue, and the MPC embraces the view that causing a result with a mental state of K is 
more difficult to justify than causing a result with a mental state of R, the issues surrounding 
justification are not a principal aim of this investigation. 
 47.  Because our question of interest was only whether the above changes, en masse, had an 
effect on our experimental results, and not the differential effect of each change, we did not run 
multiple experiments for the various manipulations. This limits our ability to causally link any 
one definitional change to differences in the punishment ratings or sorting accuracy. Causal 
inferences about the effect of a particular phrase should be further investigated if deciding upon a 
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We ran both a sorting and a punishment task, with independent 
samples, as a part of this experiment. For both tasks, all components of 
the experimental design, other than the definitional changes, stayed 
the same as in the original study, including all of the text of the 
scenarios.48 Thus, any difference in sorting or punishment rating can 
be attributed to these modifications in the mental states definitions. 
  
single phrase with which to instruct jurors, but our initial research goal here was to see if 
improving the set of definitions employed in the experiment could improve sorting accuracy. 
 48.  One additional change concerned the recruitment of subjects. In the original study, we 
paid Qualtrics to recruit subjects for us. In the new series of studies, we used Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk service to recruit subjects directly. Multiple studies have validated results using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk on a variety of assessments, especially when compared to samples of convenience. 
See, e.g., Tara S. Behrend et al., The Viability of Crowdsourcing for Survey Research, 43 BEHAV. 
RES. METHODS 800 (2011); Adam J. Berinsky et al., Evaluating Online Labor Markets for 
Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL. ANALYSIS 351 (2012); Michael 
Buhrmester, Tracy Kwang & Samuel D. Gosling, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A New Source of 
Inexpensive, yet High-Quality, Data?, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 (2011); Joseph K. Goodman et 
al., Data Collection in a Flat World: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples, 
26 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 213 (2012); Jon Sprouse, A Validation of Amazon Mechanical Turk 
for the Collection of Acceptability Judgments in Linguistic Theory, 43 BEHAV. RES. 155 (2011). 
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Table 1: Definitions Used in Original Study and  
in New Experiment 149 
 
Original Definitions 
 
New Definitions 
1. Purposefully: A person acts 
“purposefully” when his conscious 
objective is to cause the specific result. 
1. Purposefully: A person acts 
“purposefully” with respect to a result 
when his conscious objective is to 
cause the specific result. 
2. Knowingly: A person acts 
“knowingly” when he is aware that his 
conduct is practically certain to cause 
the result. 
2. Knowingly: A person acts 
“knowingly” with respect to a result 
when he is aware that his conduct is 
practically certain to cause the result. 
3. Recklessly: A person acts “recklessly” 
when he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustified risk that a 
result will occur or that a circumstance 
exists. 
3. Recklessly: A person acts 
“recklessly” with respect to a result 
when he is aware of a substantial risk 
that his conduct will cause the result. 
4. Negligently: A person acts 
“negligently” when, through a gross 
deviation from the standard of care 
that a reasonable person would 
exercise, he fails to perceive a 
substantial and unjustified risk that a 
result will occur or that a circumstance 
exists. 
4. Negligently: A person acts 
“negligently” with respect to a result 
when, through a gross deviation from 
the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would exercise, he fails to 
perceive a substantial risk that his 
conduct will cause the result. 
5. Blamelessly: A person is “blameless” 
even though he may have caused harm, 
if he lacked any of the culpable mental 
states defined above. 
5. Blamelessly: A person acts 
“blamelessly” when he does not have 
any of the culpable mental states 
defined above. 
 
2. Variation in Signaling Phrases 
Signaling mental states requires developing a fact pattern (i.e., 
a “theme”), and using words to describe the mental state within that 
fact pattern (i.e., a “scenario”). For the original study, we communicated 
John’s mental state with regard to the harm being caused in the 
following way. 
 49. In addition to receiving the definitions, subjects were told:  
A crime is committed when the defendant has committed a voluntary act prohibited by 
law accompanied by a culpable mental state. Voluntary act means an act performed 
consciously as a result of effort or determination. Culpable mental state means either 
purposefully, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as explained in this instruction. 
Proof of the commission of the act alone is not sufficient to prove that the defendant had 
the required culpable mental state. The culpable mental state is as much an element of 
the crime as the act itself. 
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If we label harm as the y variable and John’s action in the 
scenario as the x variable, then within each theme x varies, y remains 
constant, and the general relationship between x and y is as follows: 
 
x Purposefully: John decides to cause [or bring about] y by doing x. 
x Knowingly: John does x, practically certain that it will result in 
y. 
x Recklessly: John does x, aware there is a substantial risk that y 
will occur. 
x Negligently: John does x, failing to perceive a substantial risk 
that x may cause y. 
x Blamelessly: John does x, and despite being as careful as he could 
be, y happens. 
 
The words used above (for P, K, R, and N) to describe the 
relationship between mental state (actus reus) and the resulting harm 
are words taken fairly directly from the language provided by the MPC 
to describe each mental state—for instance, “practically certain” 
describing knowing. 
One experimental design could strictly adhere to MPC language 
by using only these formulations. But using just these MPC signaling 
terms creates two problems. The first concerns habituation. If we 
exposed subjects to identical signaling language for each mental state, 
it’s likely that over the course of the experiment (as they spotted that 
same word multiple times) they would recognize the phrase as a sort of 
code word for the mental state. The second problem is that using only 
the MPC formulation leaves us unable to say anything about whether 
the MPC language could be improved. For instance, would substituting 
“almost positive” for “practically certain” be easier for subjects to 
understand? In our new Signal Variant Experiment we modified our 
experimental design to allow us to answer such questions.50 
In the Signal Variant Experiment, we tested the effect of 
signaling phrases as follows. First, from the thirty themes used in the 
original study, we selected nine themes on the basis of behavioral data 
from the original study indicating that subjects were more capable of 
accurately parsing the K/R distinction for those themes.51 The nine 
 50.  In the original study, five alternatives for each mental state signaling phrase were 
developed. But each of the 150 scenarios was assigned one and only one signaling phrase. Because 
we did not rotate all five alternative phrases for each scenario, the design did not allow us to 
determine whether a particular phrase was more (or less) helpful in allowing subjects to accurately 
sort the mental states. 
 51.  Of our original thirty scenarios, we selected those scenarios where the mean punishment 
ratings were higher for the K scenarios as compared to the R scenarios and where the classification 
accuracy for both K and R scenarios were above 35% in the classification experiment. We took this 
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themes we used included three themes each from our three harm levels 
(low, medium, and high). For each theme, we had already developed 
(from the original study) five scenarios, one for each mental state. We 
dropped the blameless scenario52 and then created twenty scenarios for 
each theme: five signal variants for each of the four mental states. Table 
2 illustrates the twenty variations that were generated for a single 
theme. 
We ran both a sorting task and punishment rating task as part 
of the Signal Variant Experiment. In each, subjects were randomly 
assigned to read one of these twenty variants for the nine different 
scenarios included in the experiment. This allowed us to determine the 
extent to which particular signals differentially contributed to the 
punishment effects seen in the original study. In addition, by comparing 
the results of the sorting and punishment rating tasks, we can tell 
whether the differences in sorting accuracy reliably correlate with the 
punishment ratings. In other words, do those R signals that are more 
likely to be confused with K result in higher punishment, and do those 
K signals that are more likely to be confused with R result in lower 
punishment? 
 
 
approach recognizing the possibility that there may have been scenarios in our original experiment 
that made the K/R boundary particularly difficult for subjects to grasp. Because these scenario-
specific errors are not of greatest interest, we selected those scenarios where the scenario itself 
was least likely to drive an effect. Further, due to the sheer number of scenarios that needed to be 
written (twenty variants for each scenario), performing the study using all thirty scenarios (six 
hundred unique variants in total) was impractical. These two filters isolated eleven candidate 
scenarios and we selected three scenarios from each harm level, leaving us with the nine scenarios 
used in the present study. This selection process did have the effect of creating a K/R punishment 
difference across the group where one did not exist in the full set of thirty scenarios. The difference 
was minor but significant. For this reason we compare the punishment difference between K and 
R in Experiment 3 to the results from Experiment 2 (where a marginal punishment difference was 
present) as opposed to our original results (where no punishment difference was present).  
 52.  Unlike the other mental states, the pertinent facts in the blameless scenarios were much 
more dependent on the context provided beyond the signaling language than other scenarios—for 
example, a gust of wind or an unforeseen natural event. This made it nearly impossible to create 
multiple variants of a blameless scenario just by changing the signaling language. Even though 
we no longer included blameless scenarios, we kept a blameless scenario in the anchoring 
“practice” questions provided at the start of the survey, and we also kept blameless as an answer 
choice in the sorting tasks. This allows for meaningful comparison between the various studies.  
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3. Revised Recklessness Experiment 
A third modification of the original study concerns the 
construction of the recklessness signaling phrases (Table 3). The most 
significant concern was the inclusion of the choice language attached to 
the end of the original signals (e.g., “but chooses to ignore” the risk). As 
discussed previously in the context of the MPC definitions, this 
language, which was not included in the knowing signals, may have 
contributed to the K/R confusion. To make our signaling language 
consistent with the revised definitions, we removed the “but chooses to 
ignore” language from our R signals. 
In addition, two of the original recklessness signaling phrases—
”realizes it is very likely” and “conscious of the likelihood”—may have 
communicated too high a probability level, thus conflating them with 
knowing.54 Specifically, both signals may have conveyed to the reader 
that the result was not only possible but probable. It can be argued, 
however, that this level of risk was not consistent with the intent of the 
MPC, which only requires the probability of the risk to be “substantial” 
in order to reach the threshold for recklessness. 
The decision about what words to use for recklessness raises 
fundamental questions about what the MPC drafters intended and, 
more generally, how judges and commentators understand and apply 
the distinction between K and R. We recognize that the meaning of 
“substantial” risk is meant to be contextualized in relation to the nature 
of the harm; however, at the same time, we think that a relatively low 
(though real) probability may be sufficient to establish recklessness, 
especially in high-harm cases.55 With this in mind, we adjusted some of 
 54. In addition, one of our original signals for recklessness inadvertently included the word 
“knows” (“knows there is a good chance”). In Experiment 3 we replaced the word “knows” with 
“recognizes.” 
 55. This is the position taken in the Colorado Supreme Court case People v. Hall: 
Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because 
the magnitude of the harm is potentially great. For example, if a person holds a revolver 
with a single bullet in one of the chambers, points the gun at another's head and pulls 
the trigger, then the risk of death is substantial even though the odds that death will 
result are no better than one in six. . . . Conversely, a relatively high probability that a 
very minor harm will occur probably does not involve a “substantial” risk. Thus, in order 
to determine whether a risk is substantial, the court must consider both the likelihood 
that harm will occur and the magnitude of potential harm, mindful that a risk may be 
“substantial” even if the odds of the harm occurring are lower than fifty percent. 
999 P.2d 207, 217–18 (Colo. 2000). For further discussion, see Simons, supra note 2, at 189–92. 
 The Commentary to the Model Penal Code states as follows: 
Even substantial risks . . . may be created without recklessness when the actor is 
seeking to serve a proper purpose, as when a surgeon performs an operation that he 
knows is very likely to be fatal but reasonably thinks to be necessary because the 
patient has no other, safer chance. [Footnote 14] . . . Some standard is needed for 
determining how substantial and how unjustifiable the risk must be in order to warrant 
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the signals meant to convey likelihood in order to communicate the 
relatively low probability that we believe is sufficient for a finding of 
recklessness. These changes are noted in Table 3. Recognizing that our 
conceptualization of what is and what is not recklessness is debatable, 
our goal here was to push the lower bounds of the requirements for 
recklessness in order to determine whether doing so produces a 
separation between subject responses to recklessness and knowledge 
scenarios. Because we do not observe such a distinction in the data, we 
are not concerned that we might have departed from the canonical 
meaning of recklessness in our signaling language. 
Whether to eliminate the “choice” language is more complicated 
because it opens up the question of the actor’s motivation for taking the 
risk and whether he had good (possibly justifiable) or understandable 
reasons. However, we designed the scenarios so that the actor’s reasons 
for acting were palpably not good enough to justify taking the risk. 
As with the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment and the Signal 
Variant Experiment, we ran a sorting task and a punishment rating 
task as part of the Revised Recklessness Experiment. As before, we 
used a different set of subjects to perform the two tasks. 
 
  
a finding of culpability. There is no way to state this value judgment that does not beg 
the question in the last analysis; the point is that the jury must evaluate the actor's 
conduct and determine whether it should be condemned. The Code proposes, therefore, 
that this difficulty be accepted frankly, and that the jury be asked to measure the 
substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk by asking whether its disregard, given the 
actor's perceptions, involved a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-
abiding person in the actor's situation would observe. 
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 237 & n.14 (1985). Footnote 14 states, in 
part: “On the other hand, less substantial risks might suffice for liability if there is no pretense of 
any justification for running the risk.” Id. at 237 n.14. 
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Table 3: Comparison of Phrasing in Original Study and in the 
Revised Recklessness Experiment 
 
Signal Phrasing for Reckless in 
Original Study 
 
Signal Phrasing for Reckless in 
Experiment 3 
Aware there is a substantial risk that 
[the harm will occur], but chooses to 
ignore [it/the risk].  
Aware there is a substantial risk that 
[the harm will occur].  
Realizes it is very likely that [the harm 
will occur], but decides to [act] anyway.  
Realizes there is some risk that [the 
harm will occur].  
Conscious of the likelihood that [the 
harm will occur], but simply doesn’t 
care.  
Conscious of the real risk that [the harm 
will occur].  
Understands that [the harm could easily 
happen], but decides to risk it.  
Understands that [the harm could easily 
happen].  
Knows there is a good chance that [the 
harm will occur], but chooses to [act] 
anyway. 
Recognizing there is a good chance that 
[the harm will occur]. 
 
B. Experimental Methods 
The three experiments discussed in the previous section were 
conducted in a similar way to our original study. Each subject who 
participated in an experiment was asked to read a series of short 
scenarios and answer a single question about the scenario’s protagonist 
after each one. As noted above, for Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 we 
utilized a selected subset of nine themes, and for Experiment 1 we 
utilized the entire original set of thirty themes. 
The experiments were conducted between December 2012 and 
May 2013.56 We used a web-based experimental platform called 
Qualtrics. Research using Qualtrics-based experiments has been 
published and presented in a number of academic fields, suggesting 
that it meets scholarly expectations for quality online web-based 
experiments.57 
 56. The University of Minnesota Institutional Review Board Human Subjects Committee 
determined that the study was exempt from review under federal guidelines. See 45 C.F.R. 
§ 46.101(b)(2) (2014). The study, Study No. 1211E24181, is on file with the authors. 
 57. Studies relying on Qualtrics experiments include Jonathan S. Abramowitz et al., 
Obsessive–Compulsive Symptoms: The Contribution of Obsessional Beliefs and Experiential 
Avoidance, 23 J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 160, 162 (2009); Yany Grégoire et al., When Customer Love 
Turns into Lasting Hate: The Effects of Relationship Strength and Time on Customer Revenge and 
Avoidance, 73 J. MARKETING 18, 21 (November 2009); and Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility 
of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 2004 (2010). 
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All subjects were recruited via modest, market-rate payments 
made available through Amazon Mechanical Turk’s payment service.58 
Separate samples were recruited for each experiment. No personally 
identifying information was collected. Studies assessing the quality of 
Turk subjects have found them to be engaged by the online 
experimental stimuli and to be more representative than the 
convenience samples that would otherwise be used.59 As discussed in 
more detail in Appendix B, filtering questions were used to ensure that 
subjects were actively participating throughout the course of the 
experiment. 
All subjects recruited were self-reported United States citizens 
age eighteen to sixty-five. The number of subjects for each experiment, 
reported in Table 4, allowed sufficient statistical power to robustly test 
our hypotheses. At the end of the experiment, we collected demographic 
information from subjects. Table A1, located in Appendix A, shows 
these results. While not a truly nationally representative sample, the 
1,613 subjects who participated in the experiments came from all 50 
states, Washington, D.C., American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands. Our sample was roughly equal in terms of gender, with 
52% of subjects being female and 48% male. Our subjects were younger 
on average than the comparable U.S. population. Our sample was 77% 
white, about equivalent to the national average. In terms of education, 
our subjects are slightly skewed toward having more education. Income 
distributions of our subjects and the U.S. population as a whole are 
similar, though not identical. 
 
 58. No personally identifying information was collected aside from a thirteen-character ID 
number provided by the worker for the purposes of tracking survey completion, obtaining payment, 
and preventing the same individual from completing the same or related surveys. 
 59. See supra note 48. 
Table 4: Number of Subjects in Study by Experiment 
 
Experiment Number of Subjects 
1a. Revised MPC Definitions Experiment - Sorting 96 
1b. Revised MPC Definitions Experiment - Punishment 94 
2a. Signal Variant Experiment - Sorting 531 
2b. Signal Variant Experiment - Punishment 509 
3a. Revised Recklessness Experiment - Sorting 186  
3b. Revised Recklessness Experiment - Punishment  197 
  
TOTAL SUBJECTS, ACROSS ALL EXPERIMENTS 1,613 
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C. Results 
In this Section we report on the results from each of our three 
new experiments. Each experiment consists of two subparts: a sorting 
task and a punishment rating task. In Appendix A, we provide 
additional discussion of the details of the statistical analysis.60 
1. Experiment 1: Revised MPC Definitions 
The results from the sorting portion of the Revised MPC 
Definitions Experiment reveal the same basic pattern found in the 
original study: subjects are best at sorting purposeful and blameless 
mental states, worst at sorting recklessness, and in the middle with 
knowing and negligent mental states. A summary of sorting results is 
presented in Table 5, along with a comparison to the results of the 
original study. 
Although the overall pattern remained the same, accuracy of N 
and R did increase in the new study. R improved from 40% to 47%, and 
N improved from 48% to 63%. This at least suggests that the new 
language may better communicate the distinction between these two 
mental states. But subjects in the new study were also less likely to 
correctly identify blameless scenarios, dropping from 88% to 78%. 
Turning to the punishment task, we find that, even with the 
revised MPC definitions, subjects do not significantly differentiate 
between K and R in their punishment ratings across the thirty themes. 
Purposeful action was punished at 5.7, knowing at 4.9, reckless at 4.8, 
negligent at 3.4, and blameless at 1.4. Graphically, Figure 1 (which 
bears remarkable resemblance to the similar figure in the original 
study) clearly shows that, even with the revised definitions, there is no 
significant punishment differentiation between the knowing and 
reckless scenarios. 
  
 60. In this Section, we use several types of statistical analysis to assist us in drawing 
inferences from the data we collected. Using widely accepted methods, we estimate the likelihood 
that a difference in the sample means reflects a true difference in the population means. When we 
make an inferential statement in the body of the text (e.g., classification accuracy increased), this 
indicates that the statistical analysis (details available in Appendix A) indicated that there is a 
less than 5% chance that the effect we observed was due to chance. Another way of stating this is 
that our presented results are all statistically significant at a p-value of 0.05. This is the 
conventional standard for statistical significance in the natural and social sciences. Smaller p-
values indicate a greater certainty that the observed effect is real. Statistical significance is not 
the same as legal or policy significance because a statistically significant difference is not 
necessarily great in magnitude. Whether an observed effect has legal significance involves policy 
and normative questions beyond the statistical test.  
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Table 5: Comparing Accuracy of Mental State  
Sorting: (A) Revised MPC Definitions Results  
and (B) Original Study Results 
 
A. Revised MPC Definitions 
 Correct Mental State 
      
 Purposeful Knowing Reckless Negligent Blameless 
Subject chose: 
Purposeful 81% 7% 6% 2% 2% 
Subject chose: 
Knowing 10% 53% 36% 7% 2% 
Subject chose: 
Reckless 5% 27% 47% 18% 5% 
Subject chose: 
Negligent 4% 9% 10% 63% 14% 
Subject chose: 
Blameless 1% 3% 1% 10% 78% 
 
B. Original Study  
 Correct Mental State 
      
 Purposeful Knowing Reckless Negligent Blameless 
Subject chose: 
Purposeful 78% 9% 5% 2% 0% 
Subject chose: 
Knowing 14% 50% 42% 5% 1% 
Subject chose: 
Reckless 5% 30% 40% 31% 3% 
Subject chose: 
Negligent 2% 10% 12% 48% 8% 
Subject chose: 
Blameless 1% 2% 1% 15% 88% 
What to Notice in Table 5: Even with the Revised MPC Definitions, subjects struggle to 
differentiate knowing from reckless and reckless from negligent. Subjects continue to 
do well at identifying purposeful and blameless actions. 
 
Note: The gray cells in Table 5 display the sorting success rate for each mental state. 
The clear cells display the percentage of responses across the other four (incorrect) 
options. For instance, looking at the column labeled “Purposeful” in section A, subjects 
correctly identified these scenarios 81% of the time; 10% of the time mistook them for 
knowing; 5% of the time mistook them for reckless; 4% of the time mistook them for 
negligent; and 1% of the time mistook them for blameless. 
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Figure 1: Average Punishment Ratings for Scenarios from 
Experiment 1B (“Revised MPC Definitions, Punishment 
Rating”) 
 
What to Notice in Figure 1: Even using the Revised MPC Definitions, the average 
punishment ratings for knowing and reckless scenarios cross each other repeatedly, 
visually presenting what is confirmed by the statistical analysis discussed in Appendix 
A: there is no significant difference between punishment ratings of knowing and 
reckless scenarios. 
 
Notes: Data for this figure are from the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment 
Punishment Rating task. The y-axis plots average harm rating for each purposeful, 
negligent, and blameless scenario in each of thirty themes (averaged across all subjects 
who rated the particular scenario). Shading indicates the mental state of the scenario. 
2. Experiment 2: Signal Variant Experiment 
In the next two experiments we tested the effects of changing 
the language used in our scenarios on sorting accuracy and punishment 
ratings. Specifically, in the Signal Variant Experiment we identified 
higher-accuracy and lower-accuracy variants of our signal for 
recklessness. Then, in the Revised Recklessness Experiment, we 
replaced the lower-accuracy language with revised phrases aimed at 
improving sorting and punishment differentiation. 
Starting with the Signal Variant Experiment, our analysis 
revealed a robust effect of signaling language on subjects’ ability to 
accurately identify reckless scenarios (Table 6). The results show that 
the R signals cleanly divided into two higher-accuracy R signals and 
three lower-accuracy R signals. The two higher accuracy signals were 
“understands that [the harm could easily happen], but decides to risk 
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it” (54% correct) and “aware there is a substantial risk that [the harm 
will occur], but chooses to ignore [it/the risk]” (52% correct). The three 
lower accuracy signals were “realizes it is very likely that [the harm will 
occur], but decides to [act] anyway” (42% correct), “conscious of the 
likelihood that [the harm will occur], but simply doesn’t care” (39% 
correct), and “knows there is a good chance that [the harm will occur], 
but chooses to [act] anyway” (39% correct). 
The results suggest that some words can better communicate 
recklessness than others. But even with the improved sorting results, 
our analysis revealed no statistically significant difference in 
punishment ratings across the various signals that we used to 
communicate the reckless mental state. 
To further examine the nature of the relationship, we asked 
whether there was a significant correlation between an R signal’s 
likelihood of being misinterpreted as a K signal and the mean 
punishment rating assigned to that signal. We found no correlation 
between these two factors. 
 
Table 6: Sorting Accuracy of Recklessness in Experiment 2A 
 
More Accurate R Signals: 
% 
Accurate 
1. Understands that [the harm could easily happen], but decides to 
risk it.  
54% 
2. Aware there is a substantial risk that [the harm will occur], but 
chooses to ignore [it/the risk].  
52% 
 
Less Accurate R Signals: 
% 
Accurate 
3. Realizes it is very likely that [the harm will occur], but decides to 
[act] anyway. 
42% 
4. Conscious of the likelihood that [the harm will occur], but simply 
doesn’t care.  
39% 
5. Knows there is a good chance that [the harm will occur], but chooses 
to [act] anyway.  
39% 
 
3. Experiment 3: Revised Recklessness Experiment 
The Revised Recklessness Experiment utilized the modified 
mental states definitions (as used in the two experiments just 
described) and also modified the signals for recklessness, as presented 
in Table 3. In brief, we modified the recklessness language by removing 
the choice language, which had been present in R signals but not K 
signals, and by reducing the probability of risk communicated in certain 
signals. 
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As presented in Table 7, we found that the adjustments to our R 
signals produced a marked improvement in sorting accuracy. The 
improvements in sorting accuracy were not limited to the R scenarios. 
The changes also seemed to improve our participants’ ability to 
understand the K/R and R/N boundaries, as indicated by robustly 
improved classification of the K and N mental states as well (see Figure 
2). This is despite no changes being made to how we communicated 
either of these mental states between Experiments 2 and 3. 
We also investigated whether the changes we made to the 
signaling language—which resulted in higher sorting accuracy—were 
accompanied by other changes in the way subjects classified the various 
scenarios. For instance, it is possible that improvement in sorting 
accuracy for R scenarios is associated with an increase in the instances 
where subjects misidentify R scenarios as N scenarios while reducing 
instances where subjects misidentify R scenarios as K scenarios. 
Comparing the results from the Revised Recklessness 
Experiment with the results using the Original Reckless Definitions 
Experiment, we found that there was no statistically significant 
difference in the breakdown of incorrect responses for the P and R 
mental states. There was, however, a significant difference in the 
distribution for the K and N mental states. This difference is driven by 
an increase in subjects misclassifying K scenarios as R in the Revised 
Recklessness Experiment, an increase in subjects misclassifying N 
scenarios as B, and a decrease in subjects misclassifying N scenarios as 
K or R. In sum, when we do see a statistically significant difference, we 
see subjects more frequently classifying scenarios into less culpable 
mental states as a result of our changes to the language of recklessness. 
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Table 7: Change in Sorting Accuracy of Recklessness: 
Experiment 2A vs. Experiment 3A 
 
Experiment 2A 
Original Reckless 
Definitions 
Accuracy 
 
Experiment 3A 
Revised Reckless 
Definitions 
Accuracy 
(Change) 
Aware there is a substantial 
risk that [the harm will occur], 
but chooses to ignore [it/the 
risk].  
52% 
Aware there is a 
substantial risk that 
[the harm will occur].  
65%  
(+13) 
Realizes it is very likely that 
[the harm will occur], but 
decides to [act] anyway. 
42% 
Realizes there is 
some risk that [the 
harm will occur].  
70% 
(+28***) 
Conscious of the likelihood 
that [the harm will occur], but 
simply doesn’t care. 
39% 
Conscious of the real 
risk that [the harm 
will occur].  
53% 
 (+14*) 
Understands that [the harm 
could easily happen], but 
decides to risk it.  
54% 
Understands that 
[the harm could 
easily happen].  
52%  
(-2) 
Knows there is a good chance 
that [the harm will occur], but 
chooses to [act] anyway. 
39% 
Recognizes there is 
a good chance that 
[the harm will occur]. 
56% 
(+17*) 
 
Notes: Table 7 compares the ability of participants to accurately classify scenarios when 
using the original reckless signals and when using the modified reckless signals (see 
Table 3). Aside from changes to the signaling language, no other changes were made to 
the scenarios or study design between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. The number in 
parentheses in the fourth column notes the change in sorting accuracy in terms of 
absolute percentage points. * = Stat. Sig. at p < 0.05; *** = Stat. Sig at p < 0.0005. 
 
What to Notice in Table 7: Reducing the communicated probability (e.g., from “very 
likely” to “some risk” and from “likelihood” to “real risk”) improved the ability of 
participants to accurately identify the mental state. Further, removing the term 
“know,” which might have further confused participants, from one of the reckless 
indicators also resulted in an improvement in sorting accuracy for that signal. While it 
is true that we also removed “choice language,” the improvements we see are not even 
across the board, as would be expected if the improvements were due to the removal of 
such language. In fact, we only see statistically significant improvements on those 
signals that implement the modified probability language. This is strong evidence that 
removing the choice language was not a primary causal factor in the improvement we 
see in sorting accuracy. 
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Figure 2: Sorting Accuracy in Original Study, Revised MPC 
Definitions Experiment, and Revised Recklessness Experiment 
Notes: The above figure presents the sorting accuracy for the culpable mental states 
across three experiments: the original study (“2011 Study”) and the sorting components 
of the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment (“Exp. 1 – Improved Defs.”) and the Revised 
Recklessness Experiment (“Exp 3 – Improved Defs. & Reckless Signals”). We denote the 
significance of the change between the original study and Revised MPC Definitions 
Experiment over the middle column bars in each cluster. We denote the significance of 
the change between the Revised Recklessness Experiment and the Revised MPC 
Definitions Experiment over the third column bars in each cluster. ns = p > 0.05; * = 
Stat. Sig. at p < 0.05; *** = Stat. Sig. at p < 0.0005. 
What to Notice in Figure 2: This figure visualizes the net improvement that the various 
changes implemented to our paradigm revealed. Alterations to the mental state 
definitions result in modest improvements to R sorting accuracy and robust 
improvements to N sorting accuracy. We did not see substantial improvement to the 
various mental state categories until adjusting the language used to communicate 
recklessness to participants. Notably, this change not only improved sorting accuracy 
for R but for K and N as well. This is despite no alterations being made to these signals 
between the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment and the Revised Recklessness 
Experiment. 
 
In the punishment rating task for the Revised Recklessness 
Experiment, we found no significant difference in the punishment 
ratings that subjects assess when employing the revised signals. 
We then tested whether the improvement in sorting accuracy 
was followed by a greater separation in punishment ratings for K and 
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R scenarios. In other words, now that participants can better 
differentiate K and R scenarios, do they change the relative 
punishments assessed to K and R scenarios? We find that there is no 
change in the relative punishments given to R and K variants of the 
nine themes. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
There are both practical and theoretical implications from our 
results. At a practical level, the results offer concrete, if preliminary, 
guidance to courts and legislatures when constructing mental states 
definitions. While the mental states will likely always be difficult for a 
lay juror to grasp, we show that this confusion can be mitigated through 
careful word choice. 
The results also contribute to an ongoing scholarly debate about 
the utility of the MPC’s present construction of its mental state 
categories. We argue in this Part that our new results, while not yet 
dispositive, give strong support to the conclusions that lay subjects can, 
under the right conditions, see a distinction between knowing and 
reckless conduct causing harmful results, but that they typically fail to 
see a corresponding distinction in moral culpability. 
A. Improving Sorting by Improving the Language of Recklessness 
In our original study, we wrote that, if the distinction between 
knowing and reckless behavior is to have import in the criminal law, 
“legislatures and courts will have to do a better job of articulating it in 
their codes and jury instructions.”61 We also noted that, because our 
original study was “but one set of experiments in a young—indeed 
almost nonexistent—empirical literature,” caution and additional study 
was needed.62 One concern was that the language we used to define the 
several mental states and then to communicate these mental states in 
the scenarios could have been improved. 
Our new results demonstrate that, indeed, the original language 
could be improved. By modifying the language of recklessness in the 
new experiments, we were able to bring about significant improvements 
to participants’ sorting accuracy. 
These results suggest that legal actors should not be cavalier in 
describing mental states. Small differences in wording—as evidenced 
 61. Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1347. 
 62. Id. at 1344. 
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in all of our experiments—can produce significant changes in 
perception of the mental state.63 
While we can offer a general recommendation that the language 
be scrutinized, it is not yet clear exactly which words should be used in 
a particular context and what level of accuracy should be expected. The 
underlying question remains a normative one: What is the nature of the 
risk that makes it appropriate for one to be deemed criminally reckless? 
Although the drafters of the MPC clearly meant for “substantial” 
to be interpreted contextually, we believe that they intended that a 
perceived probability of harm much less than 50% would suffice, at least 
in high harm cases.64 Such a threshold of culpable risk creation is 
widely accepted and quite defensible in the types of factual scenarios 
used in our experiments—where the actor is aware of a genuine risk 
and creates or takes the risk without any morally plausible 
justification. Based on these observations, it became clear that certain 
words and phrases used in the original study communicated 
recklessness in a manner that materially contributed to lower 
classification accuracy by the participants. 
Classification accuracy may be the goal of the sorting 
experiment, but courts must weigh competing concerns. For instance, 
experimenters might develop language that generates clearer 
distinctions between knowing and reckless conduct but in doing so may 
create a separation that is not consistent with the intent of the Code. 
Whether the MPC should be revised to improve subjects’ ability to make 
distinctions or whether the confusion should instead be accepted as a 
necessary consequence of deliberately flexible definitions is a question 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
Our results suggest that changing language can improve 
sorting, but they also suggest that those improvements are limited. 
Even in our best case, only 59% of subjects are accurately identifying R 
scenarios. More than one out of every three times they read a reckless 
scenario, subjects fail to identify it as such. About 70% of these 
misidentifications are subjects believing that an R scenario 
demonstrates knowing conduct on the part of the protagonist. We are 
still left with the basic conclusion we reached in the original study: 
laypeople have great difficulty identifying and distinguishing reckless 
and knowing behavior. If jurors cannot reliably distinguish between the 
two, on what basis are they deciding whether a defendant charged with 
murder acted knowingly or recklessly? 
 63. Additional research can investigate whether K/R accuracy can be further improved 
through more drastic changes to the experimental design. What if, for instance, subjects engaged 
in a short training exercise before reading and rating the scenarios? 
 64. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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B. Punishment Ratings Are Unaffected by Improved Sorting 
Despite the improvements in classification accuracy for the R 
mental state scenarios, we did not observe a statistically significant 
change in punishment ratings for the R mental state as compared with 
the K mental state. That our subjects improved their sorting, but did 
not similarly adjust their punishment ratings, lends support to the 
argument that we see the conflation of K and R punishment because 
subjects do not see a clear moral distinction between the K and R 
mental states, at least as it concerns the result element of offenses. 
Two results particularly support this conclusion. First, as 
presented in Figure 2, we find that the propensity for an R signal to be 
misinterpreted as a K signal makes no impact on how subjects punish 
the scenarios containing that signal. This indicates that subjects do not 
reliably distinguish their punishment ratings even when perceiving a 
difference between the reckless and knowing mental states. 
The results from Experiment 3 provide further support for this 
proposition. In Experiment 3, we saw significant and robust 
improvements in R classification accuracy, but subjects continued to 
demonstrate almost no difference in how they punish (1) cases in which 
they are told that the actor consciously took a significant risk that a 
victim would be harmed, with no semblance of a justificatory motivation 
for doing so, and the harm actually occurs; and (2) otherwise identical 
cases in which they are told that the actor knew that the harmful 
outcome was “practically certain” to occur. 
What implications does this finding have for the law? The 
answer is not straightforward. Though the drafters of the MPC 
expressly adopted the K/R distinction and used it extensively in 
defining the mens rea for circumstance elements of criminal offenses, 
they rarely graded “result” crimes (i.e., offenses defined as engaging in 
conduct that causes specific harms) so as to punish knowingly causing 
the result more than doing so recklessly.65 There is, however, one 
important exception to this pattern: the grading of homicide66 (and a 
parallel distinction in assault67). Under the MPC and in virtually every 
state, a knowing murder (often called second-degree murder) is 
classified as significantly more serious than a reckless murder (often 
called manslaughter). If jurors see little or no moral distinction between 
the two, why does the law? 
 65. In other result offenses (of which there are not very many in the MPC), the offense is 
typically punishable at the same level for P, K, and R. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1(2)(a) 
(1962) (inflicting harm during a burglary); id. § 250.11 (cruelty to animals). 
 66. Id. § 210.2. 
 67.  Id. § 211.1(2). 
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A partial explanation for this puzzle may lie in the fact that the 
MPC and the law of most states also recognize a mental state in 
addition to the standard PKRN hierarchy, typically called “extreme 
recklessness (“eR”),” that is generally treated as demonstrating a level 
of culpability commensurate with acts committed purposely or 
knowingly.68 The effect of this additional mental state is to add a new 
moral gradient to differentiate R behavior from these more culpable 
mental states. While our studies have indicated that subjects do not see 
a moral distinction between K and R, it remains to be seen whether they 
are able to distinguish between R and eR. Of course, even if subjects 
were able to differentiate between R and eR, whether the eR mental 
state is a workable concept in practice depends on the extent to which 
juries are actually instructed on extreme recklessness in homicide cases 
and on how clearly the moral line between ordinary recklessness and 
extreme recklessness is defined.69 We intend to explore these moral 
judgments in subsequent studies, including an effort to create scenarios 
that draw a reasonably defensible and reliable distinction between 
cases of “extreme” recklessness and “ordinary” recklessness. 
C. Study Limitations 
As in our previous work, we recognize that the implications of 
the experiments are limited in important ways by our experimental 
design.70 
First, as with our original study, we cannot generalize beyond 
the online experimental context, which we continue to employ. It may 
be that jurors, when collectively deliberating, will understand and 
behave differently than when they are individually asked to render a 
punishment decision. Moreover, we cannot predict in any given case 
how the much richer set of facts (and their presentation through 
testimony and argument) will affect juror decision-making. Mock jury 
studies focusing on the attribution of mental states seem a promising 
 68. Id. § 210.2(1)(b) (“[Criminal homicide constitutes murder when] it is committed recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.”). In addition to 
the MPC, extreme indifference murder, sometimes called depraved-heart murder, has been 
adopted by most states. 
 69. In one of our authors’ (Morris B. Hoffman) judicial experience, jurors in Colorado murder 
cases are rarely instructed on extreme recklessness, while jurors are routinely instructed on 
ordinary recklessness as a lesser included offense. This means that the difference between K and 
R is having huge effects on the outcomes of these cases because second-degree murder (requiring 
K) is punishable by mandatory prison up to forty-eight years while reckless manslaughter may be 
punished only by a term of probation. 
 70. Shen et al., supra note 3, at 1345–46. 
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avenue to address these concerns. Postverdict interviews with real 
jurors might also be fruitful. 
Second, we readily acknowledged in the original study and again 
note here that, when mens rea is at issue in an actual case, jurors are 
not told what the defendant’s mental state is, as they are in our 
scenarios. Real jurors must rely on descriptions of the defendant’s 
conduct and the circumstances under which it occurred to infer mental 
states. And rather than receiving a single signal about the mental state, 
they will hear conflicting stories from the prosecution and the defense 
about what was going on inside the defendant’s head during the alleged 
commission of the crime. How jurors synthesize this circumstantial 
evidence in order to arrive at a conclusion about the defendant’s mental 
state remains a mystery ripe for further empirical investigation. 
Third, we have again limited the focus of our experiments to 
result elements of crimes. Our experiments do not address circumstance 
elements of a crime—that is, elements having to do with the existence 
of a particular existing or historical fact (e.g., whether the property that 
defendant possesses is stolen, or whether the person with whom the 
defendant has intercourse is younger than sixteen). The results do not 
speak to whether people can distinguish between when a wrongdoer 
“knew” that a circumstance existed, was aware of a risk that it existed, 
or merely “should have known” that it existed. In separate work, we are 
now testing the MPC assumptions as they operate for circumstance 
elements. 
Fourth, our modifications to mental state language do not 
address questions about the significance of the fact patterns themselves 
and whether laypeople are better at identifying knowing and reckless 
action when it arises from a particular type of behavior. In separate 
work we are investigating, for instance, whether crimes involving 
property damage result in blurring of the K/R boundary to a greater 
extent than crimes that result in bodily injury. 
Fifth, our definitions and signals have aimed for simplicity—to 
isolate a single operative fact that distinguishes each mental state from 
the others. Obviously, criminal codes differentiate between mental 
states in numerous ways and often depart from the basic MPC five-level 
hierarchy. Extreme recklessness is one example that is particularly 
pertinent to result offenses.71 
Finally, it is worth remembering that, outside the death penalty 
context and a few outlier states, judges (not jurors) typically perform 
the punishment function. Thus, future research should use a sample of 
judges for the punishment rating tasks. 
 71. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(1)(b); id. § 211.1(2)(a). 
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These limitations serve as an important reminder that the 
findings are incomplete and thus inadequate for deriving clear policy 
prescriptions. It has been said that “replication is the best statistic,” 
and only with replication and further extensions of this work can it 
serve policymakers and courts in their specific formulation of mens 
rea.72 
V. CONCLUSION 
The fairness, utility, and effectiveness of the criminal justice 
system hinges on how well jurors can understand and apply the mens 
rea categories. Yet the mens rea categories are notoriously difficult to 
conceptualize and define, even for experts. Every day the subtleties of 
those categories used in most jurisdictions must be explained to jurors. 
And every day the effectiveness of those explanations remains 
uncertain. 
It is vitally important that the language of mens rea conveys to 
actual jurors what the legal system has long assumed it will. Here, we 
have demonstrated that specific variations in the phrases used to define 
and to communicate criminal mental states can significantly increase 
an individual’s ability to accurately classify mental states. Yet we also 
find that there are limits to the added value of new language. Despite 
the substantial changes we made to the language used to communicate 
recklessness, subjects continued to be categorically worse at accurately 
classifying reckless behavior compared to other mental states. 
There are two practical lessons for the legal system. First, when 
it comes to communicating mental states, phrasing matters. Courts 
should therefore exercise care when considering the appropriate 
instruction; subtle variations may have substantial effects. And 
empirical legal scholars should provide courts with more data on what 
the effects of those variations are likely to be. 
Second, our results raise deeper questions about the normative 
foundations of the MPC’s mental states hierarchy. Improving subject 
accuracy in distinguishing between knowing and reckless behavior that 
causes harmful results did not translate into corresponding changes in 
the relative punishment that subjects would impose on knowing, as 
opposed to reckless, acts. Although real-life jurors are not typically 
called upon to decide punishment, it is nonetheless troubling that 
citizens apparently do not see the clear moral distinction that the MPC 
 72. STEVEN J. LUCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT-RELATED POTENTIAL TECHNIQUE 251 
(2005) (“Replication does not depend on assumptions about normality, sphericity, or independence. 
Replication is not distorted by outliers. Replication is a cornerstone of science. Replication is the 
best statistic.”). 
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presupposes between unjustifiably causing a criminal harm knowingly 
or instead recklessly. 
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VI. APPENDIX A: TECHNICAL AND STATISTICAL DETAILS 
This Appendix provides additional detail on the research design 
employed in our study, the statistical procedures used to analyze the 
data, and the results of the statistical analyses. 
A. The Participants 
Participants were recruited through Amazon’s “Mechanical 
Turk.” Mechanical Turk is an online service provided by Amazon that 
allows individuals and institutions to offer online tasks (called “human 
intelligence tasks,” or “HITs”) to people across the country for pay. This 
service provided us with a sample that, while not truly nationally 
representative, was substantially more representative than 
convenience samples that would otherwise be used. In Table A1, we 
include the self-reported demographic information of the subjects 
included in the analysis. 
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Table A1: Demographics of Experimental  
Subjects (N = 1613)73 
Education Subjects U.S. Census 
Less than HS 1% 18% 
High school / GED 11% 30% 
Some college 31% 20% 
Assoc. degree 10% 7% 
Bachelor’s 35% 17% 
Graduate Degree 12% 10% 
   
Income Subjects U.S. Census 
< $20k 32% $1 to $25k: 22% 
$20k - $40k 29% $25k to $35k: 19% 
$40k - $60k 22% $35k to $50k: 21% 
$60k - $80k 10% $50k to $65k: 14% 
$80k - $100k 5% $65k to $75k: 6% 
> $100k 3% $75k to $100k: 8% 
   
Gender Subjects U.S. Census 
Male 48% (42–56%) 49% 
Female 52% (44–58%) 51% 
   
Age Groups Subjects U.S. Census 
18-24 22% (16–28%) 13% 
25-34 42% (35–48%) 18% 
35-44 20% (14–25%) 19% 
45-59 13% (9–18%) 27% 
60 + 4% (1–7%) 23% 
   
Race Subjects U.S. Census 
White 77% 74% 
Non-White 23% 26% 
   
Jury Member in 
Criminal Case? Subjects  
Yes 9% (5–14%)  
No 91% (86–95%)   
 
 73. Some demographic information was only collected on a subset of the surveys. In those 
instances, we provide a bootstrap estimate of the 95% confidence interval for the population 
estimate to the right of the breakdown for the reported cases. If no range is provided, then that 
demographic data was collected from all 1,613 participants. 
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In the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment, we used 
approximately the same number of subjects as we used in comparable 
experiments in our original study. In the Signal Variant Experiment, 
we increased the number of subjects to account for the reduced number 
of observations per subject (since we were using nine themes instead of 
thirty), as well as the decrease in the expected effect size. We then 
reduced our sample size for the Revised Recklessness Experiment 
because, unlike the Signal Variant Experiment, we were not testing the 
differential effect of signaling language across four different mental 
states. Our statistical power requirements were thus substantially 
reduced for the Revised Recklessness Experiment. 
Concerns about subjects’ compliance with task instructions are 
of special concern with online experiments because subjects cannot be 
monitored while engaged in the experimental tasks.74 To address this 
issue, experimental psychologists have developed “attention filters” 
designed to ascertain whether subjects are in fact following instructions 
and paying attention to the material being presented to them online. In 
each of our experiments, we employed a modified version of the filter 
developed by psychologist Daniel Oppenheimer and his colleagues.75 
The design of the primary attention filter question was such that 
users who did not read carefully would see, in large font, a headline 
reading “Background Questions on Sources for News” as well as another 
large, bold question: “From which of these sources have you received 
information in the past month?” A series of check-box options were 
provided (e.g., local newspaper, local TV news). Subjects reading 
carefully, however, were instructed not to check any of the boxes, but 
instead to type “123” into the text box provided.76 In several of our 
experiments we deployed an additional attention filter. This filter 
presented each subject with a scenario that appeared similar to other 
scenarios, except that it directed participants to select a specific 
response. The results presented in this Article are based only on those 
subjects who were paying attention as assessed by these attention 
filters. 
 74. A filter employed after data collection allowed for the experiment to exclude from the 
dataset subjects with duplicate IP addresses. 
 75. See Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Tom Meyvis & Nicolas Davidenko, Instructional 
Manipulation Checks: Detecting Satisficing to Increase Statistical Power, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 867, 867–68 (2009) (describing a filter in which subjects must carefully read instructions 
which, counter to the boldface headline above the instructions, tell subjects not to actually click on 
an answer to the question). 
 76. Across the five experiments, 87% of subjects successfully answered the attention filter 
question.  
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B. The Experimental Paradigm 
For the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment, the experimental 
paradigm remained largely unchanged from the original paradigm used 
in the original study and described in Section II.B above. There were, 
however, two changes to note. First, we transitioned to using 
participants recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk instead of 
Qualtrics-recruited panels. Second, as discussed in the main text, we 
modified the MPC definitions (see Table 1). In brief, we crafted thirty 
distinct fact patterns and five variants of each fact pattern. The five 
variants served to manipulate the mental state of the actor in each 
scenario but nothing else. Participants saw only one of the five variants 
for each fact pattern and saw all fact patterns once. Therefore, 
participants saw thirty different fact patterns in total. The fact patterns 
were presented to participants in a pseudorandomized order. 
For the Signal Variant Experiment and the Revised 
Recklessness Experiment, we used a modified version of this 
experimental paradigm. The primary modification was that for each 
fact pattern we crafted twenty variants instead of five. These twenty 
variants were comprised of five different signals used to communicate 
the four different mental states in the experiment (we did not test the 
blameless mental state). Instead of using thirty different fact patterns, 
we selected nine fact patterns from the original thirty. We selected 
those nine fact patterns where subjects demonstrated the greatest 
ability to distinguish the K and R scenarios in the sorting tasks and, on 
average, punished K greater than R in the punishment ratings task. 
Again, participants were presented with a pseudorandomized order of 
the nine stems, seeing no stem twice. Likewise, participants did not see 
the same signaling language twice, and the presentation of the mental 
states was evenly distributed for each subject. 
Upon accepting the HIT on Amazon Mechanical Turk, all 
subjects were directed to the survey, which was hosted by Qualtrics. 
Before starting the survey, all participants were informed about the 
nature of the survey and their rights as participants in the study. At 
the start of the survey, we provided all subjects with the instructions 
necessary to complete the survey. Aside from changes to the mental 
state definitions, these instructions did not change between the three 
sorting tasks or the three punishment tasks. All subjects were exposed 
to five anchoring scenarios prior to starting the trials; these scenarios 
spanned the range of harm and intent that subjects were exposed to in 
the trial scenarios. Following the anchoring questions, participants 
began rating or sorting the trials of interest. Each trial was presented 
on a separate screen. On each screen, subjects were asked to read the 
2 - Ginther et al_PAGE NEW (Do Not Delete) 10/7/2014 12:58 PM
2014] LANGUAGE OF MENS REA 1369 
scenario and then either select a punishment level (in the punishment 
rating version) or identify the protagonist’s mental state (in the sorting 
version). There was no time constraint placed on subjects’ responses. 
Punishment responses were provided on a 0-to-9 scale, with 0 
being no punishment and 9 being the most extreme punishment the 
participant personally endorsed. Sorting responses were provided by 
participants clicking a radio button next to one of the five mental states 
(and accompanying definition). Both punishment and sorting responses 
were made at the bottom of the same screen that presented the scenario. 
Subjects then had to click another button to advance to the next trial. 
At the end of the trials, we presented the instructional manipulation 
check, followed by the demographic questions. Finally, subjects were 
debriefed and provided with a code to enter into Amazon Mechanical 
Turk in order to receive their compensation. We kept a record of each 
subject’s Mechanical Turk ID in order to ensure that no subject 
completed a survey more than once. 
C. Details of the Experimental Results 
In this section we detail the statistical analyses that support the 
inferential conclusions we discuss in the body of the Article. 
Starting with the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment, which 
tested the sorting accuracy of participants using the revised MPC 
definitions, we compared the sorting accuracy with our 2011 results 
using pairwise chi-squared tests. For reckless, we found that subjects 
using the revised definition were 1.3 times more likely to be correct than 
VXEMHFWV XVLQJ WKH RULJLQDO GHILQLWLRQV ǘ2(1) = 4.26, p < .05). For 
negligent, we found that subjects using the revised definitions were 1.8 
WLPHVPRUHOLNHO\WREHFRUUHFWǘ2(1) = 18.93, p < .001). We found no 
difference in the knowing condition, and for blameless, subjects using 
the revised definitions were 2.1 times more likely to be incorrect 
ǘ2(1) = 13.30, p < .001). 
We then examined the effect of the revised MPC definitions on 
punishment ratings. We first examined whether the changes were able 
to create a noticeable difference in how knowing and reckless scenarios 
were punished. A t-test comparing punishment ratings for knowing and 
reckless scenarios across the thirty themes revealed no significant 
difference t(29) = .71, p = .23. 
In the Signal Variant Experiment we analyzed the effect of 
specific signaling language on subjects’ ability to properly categorize the 
reckless mental state. A logistic regression analysis revealed a robust 
effect of signaling language on subjects’ ability to accurately identify 
WKHUHFNOHVVPHQWDOVWDWHVFHQDULRVǘ2(4) = 21.04, p < 0.001). 
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We next analyzed the effect of specific signaling language on how 
subjects punish scenarios describing reckless conduct. We ran a two-
way ANOVA, with harm level of the scenario as one factor and signal 
as the other. This analysis did not reveal a main effect of signal 
(F(4,505) = 1.781, p = 0.131). As expected, there was a significant main 
effect of harm level (F(2,507) = 684.5, p < .0001). There was no 
significant interaction between variant and harm level 
(F(8,501) = 1.414, p = .188). We also examined whether there was a 
correlation between the likelihood that a reckless signal was 
misinterpreted as a knowing signal and the punishment rating that 
subjects assigned to scenarios using that signal. We found no reliable 
correlation (r = 0.24, p = 0.70). 
In the Revised Recklessness Experiment, we assessed the effect 
of changes to the reckless mental state signals on subjects’ sorting 
accuracy. We compared the sorting accuracy with the sorting accuracy 
in the Signal Variant Experiment using a 2-proportion z-test. The 
results are presented in Table 7. We also compared the sorting accuracy 
to the sorting accuracy of subjects in our original study as well as in the 
Revised MPC Definitions Experiment. All comparisons were made 
using a two-proportion z-test. We also examined whether the 
improvement in reckless sorting accuracy was accompanied by other 
changes to the sorting behavior. To test this, we observed the frequency 
of subject responses, broken down by the actual mental state presented 
in a scenario, and compared the results between the Signal Variant and 
Revised Recklessness Experiments. There was no statistically 
significant difference in the breakdown of incorrect responses for the P 
ǘ2(3) = 2.933, p = 0.402) DQG5ǘ2(3) = 5.2, p = 0.158) mental states. 
There was, however, a significant difference in the distribution for the 
.ǘ2(3) = 9.02, p < DQG1ǘ2(3) = 9.20, p < 0.05) mental states. 
This difference is driven by an increase in subjects misclassifying K 
scenarios as R in the Revised Recklessness Experiment, an increase in 
subjects misclassifying N scenarios as B, and a decrease in subjects 
misclassifying N scenarios as K or R. 
We next examined the effect of changes to our reckless signaling 
language on punishment ratings. We entered our data into a two-way 
ANOVA, with harm level of the scenario as one factor and signal as the 
other. This analysis revealed a marginal effect of signal 
(F(4,193) = 2.321, p = 0.06). As expected, there was a significant main 
effect of harm level (F(2,195) = 173.3, p < .0001). There was no 
interaction between variant and harm level (F(8,189) = 0.207, p = .989). 
As indicated, we do observe a trend towards significance with the main 
effect of signal variant. Post hoc analysis indicates that this trend is the 
result of nonsignificantly higher punishment ratings for the “aware 
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there is a substantial risk that [the harm will occur]” signal. We also 
examined whether our improved reckless signals had an effect on how 
subjects punished reckless as compared to knowing behavior. To 
accomplish this, we compared the difference in punishment ratings for 
the reckless and knowing variants of the nine themes. We found no 
reliable difference (t(8) = -1.253, p = .246). 
We also combined the data from the Signal Variant and Revised 
Recklessness Experiments to test the marginal effects of our other 
mental state signals on sorting accuracy and punishment ratings, 
respectively. We found no effect of signal on sorting accuracy for P, K, 
or N. We performed a separate logistic regression analysis on each 
mental state, using signal variant as a categorical independent 
variable. This revealed no significant variation in sorting accuracy 
DFURVVVLJQDOVIRU3ǘ2(4) = 1.731, p = .ǘ2(4) = 4.013, p = .404), 
RU 1 ǘ2(4) = 8.137, p = .087). We did reveal some differences in 
punishment ratings that reached statistical significance. We ran three 
distinct two-way ANOVAs, with harm level of the scenario as one factor 
and signal as the other, for each of the three mental states. The models 
revealed no main effect of signal variant on punishment rating for P 
(F(4,1521) = 1.075, p = .367), a marginal effect—that does not reach the 
Bonferroni adjusted threshold of p = 0.0167—for K (F(4,1514) = 2.899, 
p = 0.021), and a robust effect for N (F(4,1521) = 7.662, p < .0001). 
Post hoc analysis of the K mental state variants revealed that 
the main effect was driven by a single variant (“Understands that [the 
harm] is almost guaranteed to occur”), which subjects punished 
marginally less than the others. Post hoc analysis of the N mental state 
variants revealed that the effect was driven by higher than average 
assessed punishment on scenarios where we describe the act as being 
done “carelessly” and lower than average punishments on scenarios 
where we describe the act as being done “hurriedly and without noticing 
[a risk of harm].” 
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VII. APPENDIX B: FULL TEXT OF SCENARIOS 
The full text of the scenarios used in the experiments discussed 
in this Article are available for download. The text of the scenarios used 
in the Revised MPC Definitions Experiment is available at: 
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/08/Ginther-
Revised-MPC.pdf. The text of the scenarios used in the Signal Variant 
and Revised Recklessness Experiments is available at: 
http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/08/Ginther-
Signal-Variant-Experiment.pdf. 
 
 
